Water Law Review
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 62

9-1-2000

Weaver v. Stafford, 8 P.3d 1234 (Idaho 2000)
M. Elizabeth Lokey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
M. Elizabeth Lokey, Court Report, Weaver v. Stafford, 8 P.3d 1234 (Idaho 2000), 4 U. Denv. Water L. Rev.
238 (2000).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 4

transfers, IDWR issued the disputed order. IDWR's order found a
portion of Sagewillow's rights forfeited and voided the approval given
on the previous application.
Sagewillow appealed IDWR's decision to the District Court of the
The district court affirmed, finding
Seventh Judicial District.
resumption of use is not a valid defense to forfeiture of a water right.
Sagewillow appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho. While several
substantive issues were raised, a procedural matter prevented the
supreme court from reaching those issues.
The supreme court noted resolution of water right and water use
disputes occurs only through the framework designated by the Idaho
Legislature. Changes to existing water rights must be made by
application to the IDWR. State statute allows judicial review of an
IDWR decision. Unless another provision of law exists, an aggrieved
party may obtain judicial review in the district court where either the
hearing was held, the final agency was taken, the aggrieved party
resides, or the property is located.
The supreme court considered the ongoing Snake River Basin
Adjudication ("SRBA") to be "another provision of law" which
precluded review by the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District.
In 1987, the Idaho Legislature created the SRBA to adjudicate all
water rights within the Snake River Basin, and the supreme court
designated the fifth district as the exclusive SRBA district court. Thus,
the SRBA precludes all private actions for water right adjudications
within the Snake River Basin.
Because Sagewillow's water rights were part of the Snake River
water system, its appeal fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
SRBA. Therefore, the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
lacked jurisdiction over Sagewillow's appeal, and the supreme court
vacated and remanded the case to the designated SRBA district court.
Sara Wagers
Weaver v. Stafford, 8 P.3d 1234 (Idaho 2000) (holding: (1)
defendant's actions in filling in an original dirt ditch running along
boundary between defendant and plaintiff's property constituted
abandonment of any prescriptive easement; (2) defendant committed
trespass by erecting a new fence between his and plaintiff's property;
and (3) plaintiff did not negligently interfere with defendant's water
rights).
This dispute involved three parcels of land owned by Plaintiff Max
Weaver ("Weaver") and Defendant Frank Stafford ("Stafford"). At the
core of the dispute was the original location of a fence and a dirt
irrigation ditch that existed as a boundary between the parcels long
before either party acquired title to their respective land. After
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purchasing his property in October 1994, Stafford removed the
original fence and filled in the original dirt ditch located between his
parcel ("Stafford property") and Weaver's parcel ("Lot 16"). In 1995,
Stafford filled in all irrigation laterals running from the original dirt
ditch that serviced his property. That same year he erected a new
Weaver regarded the fence as an
fence between the parcels.
encroachment upon Lot 16 and demanded its removal. After
removing the fence in 1997, Stafford excavated a new dirt ditch that
followed approximately the same line as the new fence. In 1995 and
1997, a surveyor conducted two boundary surveys between the Stafford
property and Lot 16 based on existing monuments. He initially
concluded the new fence encroached upon Lot 16 by a minimum of
Later, he concluded the new ditch encroached by
two feet.
approximately five to ten feet.
A cement irrigation ditch containing water ran parallel to the
original dirt ditch boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property.
This cement ditch existed for many years prior to this dispute and
irrigated fields on Lot 16 prior to 1969. During the 1995 and 1996
irrigation seasons, Stafford diverted water from the cement ditch to
irrigate his property. Weaver filed a complaint against Stafford
alleging Stafford committed trespass by erecting a fence and
subsequently excavating a ditch on his property. Stafford asserted
affirmative defenses and counter-claimed. He asserted he was entitled
by prescription or boundary by agreement to maintain a fence
Stafford also maintained a
between the adjoining properties.
prescriptive right-of-way existed. His counter-claim alleged Weaver
intentionally interfered with his appropriative water rights and that
Stafford acquired an easement by prescription to maintain an
irrigation ditch on Weaver's property. The district court entered a
judgment in favor of Weaver, finding Stafford trespassed upon Lot 16.
Stafford appealed.
The Supreme Court of Idaho determined it would only set aside
findings of facts if the facts were not supported by substantial and
The supreme court found substantial and
competent evidence.
competent evidence to support the district court's determination that
Stafford did not enter Lot 16 under color of title. In other words,
Stafford failed to present any written evidence that purportedly gave
him title to the portion of Lot 16. The supreme court also agreed that
Stafford failed to establish a prescriptive easement in the original dirt
ditch. Witness testimony failed to establish the open, notorious, or
uninterrupted nature of any prior use of the original dirt ditch or that
Weaver or any previous owner of Lot 16 had knowledge of the use. In
addition, the supreme court dismissed Stafford's argument that he had
an irrigation right-of-way by agreement in the original ditch. First,
Stafford presented no evidence of an express or implied agreement
between Stafford and Weaver, or their predecessors. Second, Stafford
destroyed the original ditch and then sought to relocate the ditch on
Lot 16.
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The supreme court next turned to Stafford's assertion that Weaver
interfered with his water rights. This allegation arose from the fact
that Weaver made changes to an irrigation lateral that provided water
to both parties' property. While the precise facts of the changes to the
lateral are complicated, Stafford basically contended Weaver
prevented him from receiving water. The court dismissed this
argument as non-meritorious because Stafford produced no evidence
of historic flow rate and because Stafford filled in the very ditch that
would have received irrigation water from the pipe Weaver installed.
Because Stafford failed to provide evidence of a prescriptive
easement or right-of-way by agreement, the supreme court affirmed
the district court's decision that Stafford trespassed and that he
demonstrated a willful disregard for Weaver's property rights by
erecting a new fence and excavating a new ditch without Weaver's
permission. In addition, the supreme court affirmed the denial of
Stafford's negligent interference with water rights claim.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
IOWA
ACCO Unlimited Corp. v. Johnston, 611 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 2000)
(holding a city's condemnation of property owner's land did not
violate either the owner's procedural or substantive due process rights,
or his equal protection rights).
Andrew Christenson ("Christenson") owned eighteen acres in
Johnston, which he leased to ACCO Unlimited ("ACCO"), his solely
owned corporation. The land resides within a "100-year floodplain,"
an area which has a one percent chance of flooding each year. The
City ofJohnston ("City") condemned Christenson's land in an effort to
obtain federal flood relief from the Economic Development
Administration ("EDA") following a massive flood in 1993. The EDA,
as a condition to dispensing funds, required the City provide evidence
that had it either acquired the Christenson property, obtained
restrictive covenants, or rezoned it as a conservation district in order to
ensure the land would not be developed. Christenson wanted to
develop the land, and sought to have the condemnation nullified,
arguing that development could have been discouraged by means
other than condemnation.
Christenson filed suit against the City seeking a permanent
injunction and declaratory relief. A condemnation commission
awarded Christenson and ACCO damages for the taking of the land,
the amount of which was subsequently increased upon Christenson's
appeal. In the present equity action, the district court ruled in the
City's favor. The City filed a motion to dismiss Christenson's appeal of

